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NOTES AND COMMENTS
rive of law but also of the American standards of justice and equality.
Submitted, that the "judgment in this case was not prejudicial to the
petitioner since the trial court orally found that five members of
the jury did tend toward the laboring class. 1 2 The court appears to
be closing the door to a practice, which if not controlled, could serve
substantial injustice in future litigation.
TAXATION
EMBEZZLED FUNDS AS INCOME
Taxpayer, employed as a bookkeeper, embezzled over $12,000
during 1941. He was convicted in 1942, sentenced for the crime, and
paroled in 1943. The Commissioner determined that the taxpayer was
required to report the embezzled funds as income received in 1941 and
asserted a tax deficiency. The Tax Court sustained the Commissioner1
and the circuit court of appeals reversed.2 Held: affirmed. The
embezzled money did not constitute income to the taxpayer in 1941
under Sec. 22 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code. Commissioner
v. Wilcox, 66 Sup. Ct. 546 (1946).8
This decision holds that embezzled funds per so are not as a
matter of law taxable income,4 reversing the previous administrative
interpretation of Sec. 22 (a) 5 approved by the Tax Court.6  The
decision has been criticized as a departure from the previous approach
that illegal gains are taxable as a matter of public policy, that the
"test" proposed is irreconcilable with other decided cases, and that
the decision ignores the practical gains to the embezzler.7
Mr. Justice Burton took sharp issue with the majority opinion,
summing up his position as follows: "Because of the legislative his-
tory of See. 22 (a), the breadth of the language used by Congress in
that section, the attempt of Congress to use the full measure of its
12. Mr. Justice Frankfurter did not understand why the judgment
wasn't free from any inherent infirmity in that it was "too large
an assumption on which to base judicial action that those workers
who are paid by the day have a different outlook psychologically
than those who earn weekly wages .. ." Principal case at p. 990.
1. T.C. Memo. Dec., 3 C.C.H. 1944 Fed. Tax Serv. T.C. Dec. 14,107(M)
2. 148 F. (2d) 933 (C.C.A. 9th, 1945).
3. Dissenting opinion Burton, J., principal case at p. 550.
4. The Treasury Department's interpretation of the decision is as fol-
lows: "The mere act of embezzlement does not of itself result
in taxable income to the embezzler for federal income tax purposes.
If the owner condones the taking of the property and forgives
the indebtedness, taxable income may result to the embezzler, de-
pending on the facts in the particular case." 4 C.C.H. 1946 Fed.
Tax Serv. 6230,'G.C.M. 24945, 1946-13-12335.
5. G.C.M. 16572, XV-1 Cum. Bul. 82 (1936).
6. See Spruance, 43 B.T.A. 221 (1941), rev'd sub nom., McKnight v.
Comm'r, 127 F. (2d) 572 (C.A.A. 5th, 1942); Kurrle v. Comm'r, P.H.
1941 Fed. Tax Serv. B.T.A. Memo. Dec. 41,085, aff'd, 126 F. (2d)
723 (C.C.A. 8th, 1942).
7. (1946) 44 Mich. L. Rev. 885; (1946) 34 Calif. L. Rev. 449,
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taxing power in that section, the long established administrative prac-
tice of holding embezzled funds to be taxable income of the embezzler,
and finally because of the arbitrary distinctions in favor of the em-
bezzler which arise from an opposite interpretation of the Code, I
believe that embezzled funds are taxable gains as defined by Congress." s
The problem of statutory construction as to previous administrative
interpretation posed by Justice Burton's dissent, indeed an important
issue, illustrates an approach to the question which the Court might
have followed in reaching the opposite result 9 The "legislative his-
tory" to which the dissent refers is the amendment of Sec. 22 (a) to
include gains or profits from illegal transactions. The taxability of
such receipts is well settled") and the majority opinion does not ques-
tion this proposition.1
Mr. Justice Burton's argument in another passage that the em-
bezzled funds should be taxable because of the embezzler's complete
possession, his exercise of dominion over the moneys, and his reali-
ation of economic value from them,12 based upon the language of
Burnet v. Wells'3 and National City Bank v. Helvering'4 is equally
applicable to gross receipts of the taxpayer from loans, the sale of
capital assets, or sales of goods. But the gross receipts concept has
been consistently rejected by the Court and by Congress from Doyle
v. Mitchell Bros. Co.25 to date.'6. This rejection applies to illegal 17 as
well as legal sources of income and seems to negate the "approach that
illegal gains are taxable as a matter of public policy" referred to above
as a basis for criticizing the result of the principal case. The rejection
of the concept of gross receipts by Congress's also seems to weaken
8. Principal case at p. 552.
9. Had the position of the Treasury been incorporated in a regulation
rather than in a G.C.M., the argument based on the administrative
interpretation would have been much stronger.
10. U.S. v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259 (1927).
11. Principal case at p. 549.
12. Principal case at p. 551.
13. 289 U.S. 670 (1932).
14. 98 F. (2d) 93 (C.A.A. 2d, 1938).
15. 247 U.S. 179 (1918), decided under the Corporation Excise Tax
Act of 1909.
16. Magill, "Taxable Income" (1945) c. 9; id. p. 373: "...it would be
unwise to assume that 'income' in the amendment [XVI] means
gross receipts. With the possible exception of the mining depletion
cases, which seem to stand upon a peculiar footing of their own,
some provision for the recoupment of the cost of goods sold, or
of the investment must be made."
17. Kjar, B.T.A. Memo. Dec., C.C.H. 1941 Fed. Tax. Serv. 7714-E(cost of goods sold deductible from illicit liquor income); James
P. McKenna, 1 B.T.A. 326 (1925) (income of bookmaker deter-
mined as gross receipts less amounts paid out to bettors, amounts
returned by reason of scratches and called-off bets, and amounts
handled as "lay-off" bets); Frey, 1 B.T.A. 338 (1925) (income from
betting on horses, playing poker and roulette set-off against
gambling losses. This provision is now incorporated in §23(h)
Int. Rev. Cede).
18. See J 22 (b) Int. Rev. Code.
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the dissenting position stated above relating to Congressional intent.
The majority opinion by Justice Murphy chose to ignore the admin-
istrative construction issue and attempted to analyze the problem in
terms of the concept of taxable income, emphasizing the necessity of
a gain or profit. "For present purposes however, it is enough to note
that a taxable gain is conditioned upon (1) the presence of a claim
of right to the funds and (2) the absence of a definite, unconditional
obligation to repay or return that which would otherwise constitute a
gain." 19 This reasoning is certainly open to serious criticism. In many
cases the taxpayer has been under a definite, unconditional legal obli-
gation to repay or return that which is taxable to him.20 The "claim
of right" test, which was established by North American Oil Consoli-
dated v. Burnet,21 has been followed, distinguished, and explained in
numerous decisions since 1932, but with little success or clarity.2
The lower federal courts seem to be in hopeless confusion as to when
a taxpayer receives funds under a "claim of right",2 and the majority
position in the principal case that a taxable gain requires "some bona
fide legal or equitable claim" is clearly incompatabile with prior deci-
sions by the Court.24 Certainly the embezzler takes the money under
19. Principal case at p. 549.
20. Boston Consolidated Gas Co. v. Comm'r, 128 F. (2d) 447 (C.C.A.
1st, 1942); Humlphreys v. Comm'r, 125 F. (2d) 340 (C.C.A. 7th,
1942), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 637 (1942); National City Bank v.
Helvering, 98 F. (2d) 93 (C.C.A. 2d, 1938); Barker v. Magruder,
95 F. (2d) 122 (App. D.C. 1948); Charleston & Western Carolina
Ry. v. Burnet, 50 F. (2d) 342 (App. D.C. 1931); Chicago, R.I. &
P. R.R. v. Comm'r, 47 F. (2d) 990 (C.C.A. 7th, 1931), cert. denied,
284 U.S. 618 (1931); Agne v. U.S., 42 F. Supp. 66 (Ct. Cl. 1941).
21. 286 U.S. 417 (1932).
22. Knight Newspapers Inc. v. Comnm'r, 143 F. (2d) 1007 (C.C. 6th,
1944) (no claim of right, dividend declaration was mistake); Clin-
ton Hotel Realty Co. v. Comm'r, 128 F. (2d) 968 (C.C.A. 5th,
1942) (acknowledged liability to repay therefore no claim of
right). But cf. Renwick v. U.S., 87 F. (2d) 123 (C.C.A. 7th, 1936);
Griffin v. Comm'r, 101 F. (2d) 348 (C.C.A. 7th, 1939) (received
under apparent claim of right believing himself entitled thereto);
National City Bank v. Helvering, 98 F. (2d) 93 (C.C.A. 2d, 1938)
(finding of Board accepted as to taking under claim as his own);
Greenwald v. U.S., 57 F. Supp. 569 (Ct. Cl. 1944) (received com-
pensation in 1934, 1935, 1936 but in 1938 discovered he must repay,
so the court says he asserted "no claim of right" to the funds);
Charles G. Duffy, 2 T.C. 5.68 (1943) (received as his own, pre-
sumably under a claim of right); H. Lewis Brown, 1 T.C. 760(1943) (North American case distinguished for here the taxpayer
had only a "qualified claim" to the whole).
23. See n. 22 supra.
24. Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331 (1940) (settlor of short term
trust denied any claim of right whatsoever); Burnet v. Wells, 289
U.S. 670 (1933) (settlor of trust to pay insurance had no claim
to funds); Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940) (assignor of
interest coupons taxable); Johnson v. U.S., 318 U.S. 189 (1943)
(politician receiving protection payments); Humphreys v. Com'r,
cert. denied, 317 U.S. 637 (1942) (ransom payments taxable to
kidnapper); Chadick v. U.S., cert. denied, 296 U.S. 609 (1935)
(graft payments).
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as valid a "legal or equitable claim of right" as does the kidnapper
to whom a ransom payment is taxed,25 or the politician to whome "pro-
tection" payments are taxable.26
Nevertheless, it is submitted that the result in the principal case
is sound. The decision does not hold that embezzled funds cannot be
taxable income, but on the contrary expressly states that if embezzle-
ment were forgiven or condoned, the embezzled funds might be
taxable.27 The opinion also states that "no single conclusive criterion
has yet been found to determine in all situations what is a sufficient
gain to support the imposition of an income tax"; and that " no more
can be said in general than that all relevant facts and circumstances
must be considered.128 This factual approach to problems of what
constitutes taxable income is to be commended. Abstract language of
decisions attempting to limit and define the single word "income"
is fruitful only in miring the courts in illogical, unsound ground from
which extrication is often difficult, if not impossible. The factual
approach to issues of taxable income has been emphasized by the
present Court in its adherence to such a standard on several different
tax problems.29
The majority opinion concludes: "Sanctioning a tax under the
circumstances before us would serve only to give the United States
an unjustified preference as to part of the money which rightfully
and completely belongs to the taxpayer's employer." 80 It is probably
25. Humphreys v. Comm'r, 125 F. (2d) 340 (C.C.A. 7th, 1942), cert.
denied, 317 U.S., 637 (1942).
26. Johnson v. U.S., 318 U.S. 189 (1943).
27. Principal case at p. 550. Helvering v. American Dental Co., 318
U.S. 322 (1943) raises the possibility of the forgiveness being a
gift and so not taxable.
28. Principal case at p. 549.
29. In Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331 (1940), technical considera-
tions, niceties of the law of trusts, and mere formalisms were
penetrated, to tax to the settlor the income of a short term trust
set up for the benefit of his wife. In Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S.
112 (1940), the gift by a father to his son of bond coupons shortly
before maturity was held insufficient to avoid tax liability of the
father for the value of the coupons. In Helvering v. American
Dental Co., 318 U.S. 322 (1943), the Court realized the essential in-
congruity of holding that a taxpayer in difficult financial circum-
stances realized income when his creditors forgave part of his
past debts in order to keep him in business as a profitable cus-
tomer. This facility for deciding cases and cutting through for-
malisms of language extends at least from U.S. v. Kirby Lumber
Co., 284 U.S. 1 (1931), and is not confined to the Supreme Court,
Knight Newspapers Inc. v. Comm'r. 143 F. (2d) 1007 (C.C.A. 6th,
1944); Greenwald v. U.S., 57 F. Supp. 569 (Ct. Cl. 1944); Paul A.
Draper, 6 T.C. 209 (1946); Walter I. Bones, 4 T.C. 415 (1944).
30. Principal case at p. 550. This result was clearly pointed up in
McCue v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. Dec., 5 C.C.H. 1946 Fed. Tax Serv.
7343 (M). An individual had misappropriated over $300,000
from. the estate of her brother. Had the amount been taxable, the
United States would hold a lien for probably well over $200,000
which would have to be satisfied before the estate could recoup any
part of its loss. Such a result is certainly not desirable.
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true, if the embezzler still had the moneys or if they were traceable,
that a trust could be impressed upon the funds to which the tax lien
would be inferiorS1 But in the situation before the Court, as in the
usual embezzlement case, the funds were gone. To give the United
States a tax lien would be to deprive the defrauded party of his par-
tial recoupment from other property of the embezzler or to defer his
eventual recoupment from property subsequently acquireds2 until such
time as the tax lien had been satisfied. To answer this argument with
"ask Congress to modify the lien", is to assert that the legislature and
not the judiciary is the only guardian of justice. Considerations of
justice or "tax morals" in reaching a decision is not a novel inno-
vation. The Court has from time to time recognized the need for
changes in rules of taxation and in the income concept. It has met
particularly harsh conditions either by modifying the rules or by
rationalizing a new solution without the aid of legislation3s
It seems apparent that the majority in the principal case realized
the essential incongruity of holding that any taxable gain arises from
the bare receipt of money or property wholly belonging to another
which must be repaid, and which in fact the taxpayer has- little pro-
bability of retaining.8, This seems to be an entirely defensible position
not only as a matter of logic but as a matter of precedent.
The taxability of receipts subject to be repaid or returned stems
at least from the decision of North Ame Oil Consolidated V. Bur-
net.35 In that case there had been a receipt of funds and a judicial
determination that the recipient was entitled to retain them. With
such objective probability of retention, the most practical manner from
the annual accounting standpoint was to tax the company in the
year of receipt.3 6 The decisions which apply the rule of taxability
show this same objective probability of retention37 This probability
31. But see U.S. v. Waddill, Holland & Flinn, Inc., 323 U.S. 353, 355
(1945).
32. See Glass City Bank of Jeanette, Pa. v. U.S., 66 Sup. Ct. 108 (1945).
33. Bull v. U.S., 295 U.S. 247 (1934); Bowers v. Kerbaugh-Empire
Co., 271 U.S. 170 (1926); Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S 331 (1940);
Helvering v. American Dental Co., 318 U.S. 322 (1943); Knight
Newspapers Inc. v. Comm'r, 143 F. (2d) 1007 (C.C.A. 6th, 1944);
Greenwald v. U.S., 57 F. Supp. 569 (Ct. Cl. 1944). See Rutledge,
J., dissenting in Douglas v. Comm'r, 322 U.S. 275 (1944).
34. In the principal case, the employer is demanding repayment and
the taxpayer has little possibility of escaping the repayment of
the funds which he embezzled. See respondent's brief, principal
case p. 5., referring to pp. 12-13 of the record.
35. 286 U.S. 417 (1932).
36. Income tax is based upon 12 month period, § 41 Int. Rev. Code; and
a line is drawn between each year, Helvering v. National Contract-
ing Co., 69 F. (2d) 252, 254 (C.C.A. 8th, 1934).
37. In Chicago, R.I. & P. R.R. v. Comm'r, 47 F. (2d) 990 (C.C.A. 7th,
1931), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 618 (1931), the persons to whom the
excess fares belonged were unknown and the probabilities clearly
were that the money would be retained by the company. In Barker
v. Magruder, 95 F. (2d) 122, 124 (App. D.C. 1938) the court states
the probability of the lendor collecting the usurious interest. In
Jacobs v. Hoey, 136 F. (2d) 954, 957 (C.C.A. 2d, 1938) the proba-
1946]-
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of retention will normally be determined at the close of the taxable
year in which the funds are received,3 8 but there are cases in which
the courts have considered subsequent events as evidence in the deter-
mination of this factual problem.39
bilities of the administrator retaining his commissions is pointed
out. In Commonwealth Investment Co., 44 B.T.A. 445 (1941) the
company receiving the income was a "dummy" of the payor; in
Board v. Comm'r, 51 F. (2d) 73 (C.C.A. 6th, 1931) a director re-
ceived payments from his company by virtue of a contract with
it; and in Patterson v. Anderson, 20 F. Supp. 799 (S.D. N.Y. 1937),
the receipt by the taxpayer was likewise under a contract with the
company in which he was a director. In these cases the probability
of the taxpayer being required to repay or refund was obviously
slight, and the Comm'r's position was that until canceled, the
contracts were legal and binding and therefore the recipient should
be taxed, Commonwealth Investment Co., 44 B.T.A. 445, 452 (1941).
In Griffin v. Comm'r, 101 F. (2d) 348 (C.C.A. 7th, 1939); Saunders
v. Comm'r, 101 F. (2d) 407 (C.C.A. 10th, 1939); and Agne v. U.S.
42 F. Supp. 66 (Ct. Cl. 1941), the payments were by corporations
to directors and the probability of retention at the end of the
taxable year of receipt was excellent. In Boston Consolidated
Gas Co. v. Comm'r, 128 F. (2d) 473 (C.C.A. 1st, 1942), the unclaimed
deposits and overpayments for gas by former customers would
undoubtedly be retained by the company. In Charleston & Western
Carolina Ry. v. Burnet, 50 F. (2d) 342 (App. D.C. 1931) unclaimed
wages, and in Lehman, B.T.A. Memo. Dec., 3 C.C.H. 1943 Fed. Tax
Serv. 7013A, unclaimed dividends, were likewise unlikely to be
repaid, at least in full. In Caldwell v. Comm'r, 135 F. (2d) 488
(C.C.A. 5th, 1943) the funds taxed were illegal "kickbacks" from
building contractors who could not have recovered them and though
the opinion pointed out the possibility of the state claiming the
funds, it was considered only a possibility. In Humphreys v.
Comm'r, 125 F. (2d) 340 (C.C.A. 7th, 1942), cert. denied, 317
U.S. 637 (1942), the victim of the ransom payments was apparently
afraid, or at least reluctant, to criminally prosecute, see Murray
Humphreys, 42 B.T.A. 857, 879 (1940), let alone demand the
return of his money. In the protection payment cases, Johnson
v. U.S., 318 U.S. 189 (1943); Richard Law, 2 T.C. 623 (1942); and
Harrison J. Freebourn, T.C. Memo. Dec., 3 C.C.H. 1944 Fed. Tax
Serv. 7587 (M); if the recovery is not barred for illegality or
because the payment was voluntary, at least the courts realize that
recovery will not be requested. The same statement applies to the
gambling cases, L. Weiner, 10 B.T.A. 905 (1928); James P. Mc-
Kenna, 1 B.T.A. 326 (1925); Frey, 1 B.T.A. 338 (1925); although
some states permit the loser to recover his funds, Ark. Dig. Stat.
(Pope, 1937) §6112 et. seq.; Conn. Gen. Stat. (1930) §4739; Laws
of N.Y. (Thompson, 1939) c. 88, §995; Ore. Comp. Laws Ann.
(1939) §64-102.
In all of these cases, the person receiving the money or property
had at least the probability, if not the certainty of never repaying
or returning that which is being taxed to him.
38. Penn v. Robertson, 115 F. (2d) 167 (1940); Comm'r v. Alamitos
Land Co., 112 F. (2d) 648 (1940), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 679 (1940).
39. Knight Newspapers Inc. v. Comm'r, 143 F. (2d) 1007 (C.C.A. 6th,
1944); Greenwald v. U.S., 57 F. Supp. 569 (Ct. Cl. 1944); H. Lewis
Brown, 1 T.C. 760 (1943). See Cardozo, J., in Sinclair Refining
Co. v. Jenkins Petroleum Process Co., 289 U.S. 689 (1933) saying
that experience should be used when available, such experience
being a "book of wisdom that courts may not neglect" and that
"no rule of law sets a clasp upon its pages, and forbids us to
look within".
[Vol 22
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The same Court which laid down the rule of taxability though
the taxpayer might be required to return or repay the funds, decided
the case of Frueler v. Helvearingo approximately one year after the
North American decision. In the F-'ueler case, a trustee had made
payments to the beneficiaries in excess of the amounts to which they
were entitled. The Court held that the overpayments were not taxable
to the beneficiaries.41 The principle of that case, that receipts are not
taxable when there is a clear obligation definite and unconditional to
repay or return them, has been applied to other decisions although
often under tenuous distinctions as to "claim of right".42 Comm"r v.
Turney's expressly enunciates the principle that tax officials are not
required to treat as income, money received by a taxpayer when under
well-settled law his receipt of it has the effect of obligating him un-
conditionally to pay that money to another. The non-taxability of funds
received by one as an agent for another illustrates this same principle."4
This rationalization of an objective probability of retention test
results in a factual problem which can be determined on the admin-
istrative level. Has the taxpayer received money or property in the
taxable year which he probably will not be required to repay or
return?, 5
National City Bank v. Helvering'6 and similar cases are seemingly
inconsistent with this test. In that case, a director had used his posi-
tion to obtain secret profits and turned them over to his company
when a Congressional investigation was threatened. The opinion by
L. Hand, J., held that the director was taxable on the funds for the
year of receipt although these funds were recoverable by the corporation.
The basis of the decision was the receipt of funds "under a claim of
right" and the practical inconvenience to the collection of revenue if
the Treasury was forced to determine the validity of the taxpayer's
receipt as against the equitable claims of the corporation. The real
question in the case was not the existence of a gain or profit, but
whether the individual director should be taxed therefor. The majority
40. 291 U.S. 43 (1933).
41. North American Oil Consolidated v. Burnet was distinguished on
the very narrow grounds that it had no application to §219, under
which taxability arose in the Frueler case.
42. Knight Newspapers Inc. v. Comm'r, 143 F. (2d) 1007 (C.C.A. 6th,
1944); Clinton Hotel Realty Co. v. Conm'r, 128 F. (2d) 968 (C.C.A.
5th, 1942) ; Comm'r v. 'urney, 82 F. (2d) 661 (C.C.A. 5th, 1936) ;
Greenwald v. U.S., 57 F. Supp. 69 (Ct. C6. 1944); H. Lewis Brown,
1 T.C. 760 (143); Walter I. Bones, 4 T.C. 415 (1944) (receipt
of check subject to dispute held no receipt at all to come within
North American rule); E.P. Madigan, 43 B.T.A. 549 (1941).
43. 82 F. (2d) 661 (C.C.A. 5th, 1936).
44. See Mertens, "Law of Federal Income Taxation" (1942) §§ 17.10
et. seq.
45. This test is expressed in Barker v. Magruder, 95 F. (2d) 122,
124 (App. D.C. 1938), and Jacobs v. Hoey, 136 F. (2d) 954 (C.C.A.
2d, 1943). This latter opinion was written by A. Hand, J., and
the case was decided by practically the same court which handed
down National City Bank v. Helvering, discussed infra.
46. 98 F. (2d) 93 (C.C.A. 2d, 1938).
1946]
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in the principal case recognizes the distinction between the bare receipt
of money or property wholly belonging to another, and the use of
those funds by the recipient resulting in a gain or profit.' 7 The dis-
tinction is both logical and practical and is not necessarily inconsistent
with the objective probability of retention test. Although the law is
well settled that a person in a fiduciary position is accountable for
secret profits, the factual variations in which the rule will be applied
does not necessarily make it probable that the fiduciary will be required
to pay over all moneys received. 8
The factual test proposed herein leaves the problem with the Com-
missioner and the Tax Court'- where on case by case precedent the
rule can be given body and the limits of probability of retention defined.
TAXATION
VALUATION OF FUTURE INTERESTS FOR FEDERAL
TAX PURPOSES
In Estate of Pompeo M. Maresil the Tax Court of the United
States gave what is believed to be first judicial recognition to a
table on the probability of remarriage.2 The Commissioner refused
petitioner's claim of an estate tax deduction for the present value
of an alimony claim, holding that the interest which ceased with the
wife's possible remarriage was too uncertain to be calculated. The
Tax Court, while recognizing the fallibility of the table offered by
petitioner, held that the deduction should be allowed.3
As recently as 1943 the Supreme Court stated that the taxpayer
is required to present evidence that the contingent interest has a
"present value" in order to overcome the Commissioner's determination
that its value is unascertainable.' Apparently the recognition of the
remarriage table will meet that requirement.
WILLS
CONFIDENTIAL RELATION-PRESUMPTION OF
UNDUE INFLUENCE
Action was brought to contest a will in which the residuary legatees
47. Principal case at p. 549, and footnote 7 of the opinion citing
National City Bank v. Helvering.
48. 3 C.J.S. §165 (agents); 19 C.J.S. §§786 et. seq. (individual profits
from corporate business); 54 Am. Jur. §§311 et. seq. (trustees).
49. See Dobson v. Comm'r, 320 U.S. 489 (1943); Paul, "Dobson v.
Comm'r: The Strange Ways of Law and Fact," (1944) 57 Har. L.
Rev. 753.
1. 6 T.C. 583 (1946), aff'd, 156 F (2d) 929 (C.C.A. 2d, 1946).
2. See 19 Proceedings of the Casualty Actuarial Society (May 26,
1933) pp. 291, 298.
3. Principal case at p. 586: "The figures presently relied upon may
leave much to be desired in the way of soundness and accuracy..."
4. Robinette v. Helvering, 318 U.S. 184, 188 (1943) cf. Humes v.
U.S,. 286 U.S. 487 (1928).
